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Population projections depend on censuses, vital statistics, and
sample surveys, all of which have deficiencies that are most
marked in developing countries.  Long-range projections by
international agencies have recently undergone major revisions,
and forecasts of the United States (U.S.) population have changed
drastically over the past four years.  The United Nations (UN)
typically prepares  high,   medium,  and  low  projections.  Even
the high projection contains optimistic assumptions about
fertility decline, while assumptions of constant or increasing
fertility receive no serious attention.  This paper suggests that
high and constant fertility projections should receive more
attention from policymakers. They should treat medium estimates
as targets achievable only through considerable programmatic
effort.  At the same time, they should plan economic and
environmental efforts to deal with the population sizes implied
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"Population projection is not a bloodless technical task, but a
publicly-charged craft of great interest to policymakers and the
public (Ahlburg and Vaupel 1990: 649)."Policies, by definition, deal with the future.  The number of
people strongly affects demand for food, shelter, health, and
infrastructure.  Therefore, in creating and monitoring social,
economic, and environmental policies, no data set is more crucial
than population projections.  Indeed, population enters as either
numerator or denominator in many of the most frequently-used
measures assessing both current and future needs.  Persons per
hectare of arable land, population per physician, or
student/teacher ratios are examples of population data in the
numerator.  But consumption or gross national product per capita
depend upon demographic denominators.  In Erlich's popular
formula for assessing future environmental impact, I=PAT
(Environmental Impact equals the product of Population size, per
capita Affluence and Technology), population projections are
critical for both the P and the A.  Besides global and national
projections, there has been increasing use of Geographic
Information Systems in local and regional planning.  This has
heightened the demand for population projections of sub-national
areas.
While professional demographers are acutely aware of the
limitations of population projections, others tend to accept them
uncritically.  In part, this comes from the prestige of the two
major international organizations that publish them--the UN and
the World Bank.  But it also stems from ignorance about how these
agencies collect and interpret population data.  Because of the
crucial policy potential of population projections, we need to
look closely at their assumptions, procedures, and shortcomings.
We begin with a brief appraisal of the basic data at the core of
the projections.
POPULATION DATA
Censuses, Vital Statistics, and Surveys: the Raw Material of
Projections
Projections usually depend on three sources of data: censuses
(usually each decade), vital statistics (continuous records of
births, deaths, and migration), and special surveys.
National Censuses
The quality and quantity of developing-country census data have
improved greatly since the 1950s, mostly because of the
availability of technical and financial assistance from
international agencies.  These groups view data collection as an
important first step toward national population planning.
Between 1965 and 1988, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) expended $105 million on data collection.
Its rationale was clear: "A central assumption of early policy
assistance was that if reliable and up-to-date information was
made available to policymakers, they would be stimulated todevelop national policies" (Maguire 1990: 44).
At the UN, the improvement of demographic data "has been one of
that organization's unqualified successes."  The relevance of
such data for population policies has long been recognized.  "At
a time when it was not yet permissible for international agencies
to promote population control, taking censuses was an outlet for
the urge to do something about the population problem" (Keyfitz
1987: 239).  A milestone occurred with the Chinese census of
1980, counting one-fifth of the world's population apparently
with a high degree of accuracy (Coale 1984).  During the decade
of the 1980s, 191 countries carried out a national census,
covering 95% of the world's population.
Vital Statistics
However, as many as 20 countries did not conduct a census during
the 1980s, and nearly all the others will not do so again for 10
years.  Since planners usually deal with the short and medium
range, 1-10 years, they need additional data sources.  For trends
between censuses, and to analyze population change into its
components of fertility, mortality, and migration, they rely on
vital statistics.  This information comes from the registration
of births, deaths, and residential moves and is often missing or
incorrect.  As Farooq and Pernia (1988: 14) put it, "It can
hardly be repeated too often that non-availability of accurate
demographic indicators in statistically less-advanced countries
remains one of the most important constraints on sound
development planning."
Unfortunately, those regions most in need of strong population
policies and programs are those most deficient in vital
statistics.  For example, about two-thirds of the world's
population has had adequate data on mortality since 1985 (Bureau
of the Census 1991).  In 71 developing countries, coverage of
births and deaths is "unknown" to the UN.  In another 42, the
coverage is less than 90% (UN 1988: 11).  According to Sadik
(1991: 44), eight of every 10 African and Asian countries, and
more than one-half of the South American countries have
unsatisfactory (less than 90%) coverage of births.  Baum and
Moriyama (1990:  4-5) argue that the situation is not improving:
"In earlier times, registration of vital events and the vital
statistics that are compiled from   these registration records
were an important concern of internationally-minded
statisticians.  Nowadays, it is not very often that one sees
mention of these subjects in the programs of  inter-national and
regional statistical conferences, or in the table of contents of
statistical journals....The temporary measures to utilize sample
surveys and indirect estimation techniques  to provide vital
statistics are still with us and still provide us with inadequate
and untimely statistics on births and deaths...the decades come
and go with little observable progress towards a permanent
solution."Sample Surveys
Surveys provide a partial solution to the deficiency in census or
vital statistics.  However, although they are often quick and
economical, they are usually one time only.  Moreover, surveys in
developing countries are not immune from problems of reliability
and validity, despite their use of better trained interviewers
than in censuses.  The experience of the World Fertility Survey
shows the formidable challenge of obtaining reliable data on such
basic matters as number of births per woman.  The group invested
heavily in technical and financial means to get accurate
fertility information from sample surveys in 38 developing
countries.  However, researchers judged that they had "reasonably
reliable" data from only 27 countries.
Among those producing inadequate data were such large nations as
Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Pakistan.  Moreover, "It was in the
very countries where the greatest attention and concern have been
directed that the World Fertility Survey, carefully designed to
take account of past survey experience, failed to provide
reliable estimates of fertility levels and trends."  Deficiencies
do not occur at random, and, unfortunately, tend to underestimate
the problem of excess fertility.  "There is the strong suggestion
of a deficit of children aged 1 and 2 for many countries, leading
to the possibility that for a number of countries recent birth
rate estimates may still be too low" (UN 1987b: 38-39).
Another problem is that each survey focuses on one substantive
area, making it impossible to investigate important
cross-disciplinary relationships.  Thus, fertility surveys rarely
contain questions about agriculture or migration while
agricultural surveys contain little on migration or fertility
(Bilsborrow and Geores 1990: 124).  A promising exception to some
of these limitations are the  Demographic and Health Surveys
sponsored by USAID.  These surveys combine detailed fertility
questions with important maternal and child health items.
Moreover, researchers have administered the surveys two or three
times in several countries, facilitating the identification of
trends.
Nevertheless, there is much room for improvement in basic data
collection, and developing countries are aware of it.  Most of
them assign a high priority to data collection and believe it is
well suited to international aid.  A 1988 UN inquiry asked
nations to rate "the priority the government assigns to current
and future international technical cooperation" for eight areas.
The ratings were "none," "low," "medium," or "high."  Of 49
responding African and Latin American developing countries, 34
rated data collection as high.  Only 29 rated family planning
programs this highly (Baldwin 1991).  Despite this emphasis,
international aid for data improvement has been declining
compared to more action-oriented population programs.  While
USAID continues to support data improvement for policy goals,
costs for data collection declined from 44% of the budget in 1965
to 33% in 1984-88.  The agency's "priorities for the future" have
moved from "assisting third world Governments in formulating
national policies to helping them supplement them" (Maguire 1990:
51).  As a proportion of all international population assistance,
basic data collection declined from a high of 7.5% in 1981 to
3.3% by 1985 (Rao 1990: 165).To summarize, the quality of the data base at the heart of
demographic analyses is only fair in many countries and is
decidedly poor in others.  It is on this somewhat shaky base that
researchers construct population projections, the most important
single set of demographic analyses.
POPULATION PROJECTIONS
The Short Life Expectancy of Population Projections
The first fact that should instill a degree of doubt about
projections is the frequency with which they require revision.
The UN revises its shorter-range projections (up to year 2025)
every two years, and the World Bank does so at least as often
[note 2].  As new data or new analytic techniques become
available, groups make changes, and they often are not trivial.
In 1982, the UN made long-range projections of a world population
of 10.2 billion by 2100 but, in 1992, raised this figure by one
billion.  In 1982, the organization projected the populations of
Asia would stabilize at 5.05 billion and Africa at 2.59 billion.
But in 1992, despite the many promising family planning programs,
the group increased the projections to 6.16 and 3.15 billion (UN
1992: 32).
The UN's 1982 projections underestimated 1990 world population by
nearly one percent (0.9%) according to its most recent estimates
(UN 1993).  The picture is less impressive for regions and
countries.  Thus, the projection for Asia made in 1982 fell 2%
short (61 million people) of the 1990 population as estimated 10
years later.  Latin America's population was over-projected by
2.6%, and Central America s by 5.8%.  At the country level, even
estimates of 1990 population made only two years apart (1990 and
1992) show considerable variation.  Of projections for 149
countries made in 1990, three-quarters were revised in 1992, half
up and half down (UN 1993: 95-103).
Unexpected increases in life expectancy in developing countries
explains most of the upward revision.  Although forecasting
mortality is easier than projecting fertility, it relies on at
least two assumptions that could be troublesome.  First, in
making alternative projections such as high, medium, and low, the
UN uses only medium mortality rates.  Thus, the projected range
of the population estimates is more conservative than it would be
if using high and low mortality estimates.
Second, "It is common practice to assume that orderly progress
will be made and that, during the projection period, catastrophes
such as war, famines or new epidemics will not occur"  (UN 1993:
84).  This assumption seems increasingly questionable in a
significant number of developing countries.  As an initial
corrective to this course, in its 1993 projections, the UN
introduced separate models considering the possible impact of the
AIDS epidemic in several African countries.  In Uganda, forexample, the UN projects an additional 1.8 million deaths between
1980 and 2005.  Assuming AIDS, it projects a population size of
26.7 million for 2005.  Without AIDS, it projects population at
29.2 million (UN 1993: 67).
But as difficult as it is to project mortality trends, it is even
more difficult to project migration and fertility.  Both require
"assumptions as to the frequency and magnitude of essentially
unpredictable events, as well as affirmations of faith concerning
the nature of the political, social, and economic life of the
future" (UN 1973: 562).  Figure 1 dramatically illustrates the
sensitivity of national population projections to unexpected
changes in birth, death, or migration rates.  This chart compares
several recent U.S. Census Bureau projections of the U.S.
population.  The current (1993) "middle estimate" for the U.S.
population in 2050 is 92 million higher than one made only four
years before.  Further, the l989 projections predicted that
population size would level off by 2030, but the l992 and 1993
trends imply indefinitely continuing growth [note 3].  If we see
such drastic shifts in levels and rates in a country with the
world s top census technicians using the highest quality data
collection and analytic procedures, what can we expect of the
projections for developing countries?
The Myth of the "Most Likely" Variant
According to Irene Taueber, "The inability of demographers to
predict future changes accurately or perhaps the inherent
unpredictability of such changes has led most of the makers of
projections to prepare several alternative series" (cited in
Brass 1970).  Since a shotgun may be the best weapon for a moving
target, the UN has traditionally prepared three projections:
low, medium, and high.
Unfortunately, both scholarly and public sources give an
inordinate amount of attention to the medium forecast.  Most
publications do not bother to cite the high and low projections,
and even official presentations may encourage the reader to
disregard them.  Thus, the UN publication THE STATE OF WORLD
POPULATION 1992 accompanies a graph with the statement:  "The
medium variant is considered the most likely" [note 4] (UN 1993:
84).
The World Bank has traditionally published only one projection,
which has been very similar to the UN's medium estimate [note 5].
This gave the Bank's projections an unwarranted appearance of
certainty.   However, the zealous reader might discover buried in
technical footnotes disclaimers such as "the assumed year of
reaching replacement level fertility is speculative and should
not be regarded as a prediction" (World Bank 1993: 318).
In 1992, the UN improved its chances of hitting the target by
increasing the number of its long range (1950-2150) projections
to six.  In addition to high and low, it added medium-low,
medium-high, constant fertility, and instant replacementfertility [note 6].  In its most recent series, the UN (1993) has
reverted to high, medium, and low variants but has retained the
constant fertility projection.  It gives projections for 211
countries for each five years until 2025.
These are short-run projections, and in the short run the
difference between high and low estimates is trivial.  In the
1992 projections, for example, the difference between highest and
lowest of the five world forecasts for the year 2000 is only
327,000 people.  But the difference between high and low
projections for the middle of the next century is nearly 5
billion.  And by 2150 the difference is about 24 billion people
(4.2 versus 28 billion).  Seemingly trivial differences in
fertility have huge implications in the long run.  The medium-low
and medium-high projections differ by only 10% in the final
assumed level of fertility (1.96 versus 2.17 births per woman).
But, by year 2150, world population would total 5.6 billion using
the medium-low assumption and 21 billion using the medium-high
(figure 2).
Perhaps because these figures are so daunting, analysts give us
the impression they have at least covered the maximum range and
that even the high estimate is improbable.  However, an analysis
by Keyfitz (1981) of past errors in projections concludes there
is one chance in three that world population will be under five
or over 21 billion by 2150.   Theoretically, exceeding the upper
limit would not be difficult.  Even the high estimate assumes
that world fertility will decline from its current 3.3 children
per woman to 2.5.  In the high estimate, the Total Fertility Rate
of Africa south of the Sahara, now at 6.4 births per woman, would
decline to 3 by 2025 and to 2.5 by the middle of the next
century.  (The low estimate assumes African fertility will
stabilize at 1.7 by 2040.)
But the "unthinkable" could occur and current world fertility
rates could stay constant.  This would result in an estimate of
21 billion people by the middle of the next century and 109
billion by its end.  The UN discounts this possibility by saying
that the constant fertility projection "incorporate(s)
unrealistic assumptions of future fertility change."  It also
says, "If 28 billion persons exceed the earth's carrying
capacity, an ultimate family size of 2.5 children is contrary to
reason or would need to be combined with higher mortality than
assumed here" (UN 1992: 7, 34).  Most recently, UN demographers
have judged that their three main variants "provide reasonable
and plausible future trends in fertility."  But they virtually
dismiss the constant fertility projection as a purely technical
exercise.  "The constant-variant projection is prepared for
analytical purposes" (UN 1993: 84).
Perhaps even more controversial than assumed declines in
fertility is the assumption that once reached, fertility will
remain at replacement levels.  Thus the Bank sets specific dates
for each country--not whether, but when [note 7].  It assumes
China will reach replacement fertility by 1995, Brazil by 2000,
Bangladesh by 2015, Pakistan by 2030, and the tardiest African
nations (Malawi and Niger) by 2055 (World Bank 1993: 290-91).
One critic of the stabilization assumption maintains mildly that
"the logic ...is hardly compelling" (Demeny 1984: 120).  Another
holds that its "only real justification...is that it isstatistically convenient" (Haub 1992: 6); and still another
maintains that the chosen dates "stem more from hope than
evidence" (Brass 1970: 148).
How are these dates determined?  The UN (1988: 21) explains that:
"The assumed date for a country to reach the replacement level is
estimated by taking into account the population policies and
programmes, adult literacy rates, school enrollment ratios, and
gross national product per capita and gross domestic product per
capita of the country. Historical, cultural and political factors
and current levels of fertility and infant mortality were taken
into consideration as well.  No mathematical equation, however,
was  set up for determining the date to reach the replacement
level from current values of those indicators...partly because
some important factors such as population policy were qualitative
indicators difficult to quantify, and partly because many
developing countries lacked reliable recent data on some
quantitative socioeconomic indicators.
The  Inevitable  Decline to Replacement
Obviously projection involves a high degree of subjectivity.
This raises a question.  How reasonable is it to set "medium"
(and therefore the "most likely" estimate) as the projection that
assumes fertility will stabilize at replacement level in the next
century?  Demographic theory does suggest that as countries
modernize, fertility and mortality will decline to low levels.
But it does not tell us when this will happen.  Although an
impressive number of developing countries have had large
fertility declines, many others have shown no sign of decline.
Data from the UN's WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS, 1990, shows there
are 31 countries where fertility rates have been constant for the
30 years between 1960 and 1990.  These countries, many in Africa,
will be 14% of developing-country population in 1995.  The World
Bank and the UN medium projections assume replacement fertility
for all of them by the middle of the next century.  This implies
a decline in total fertility of three or four children per woman
over the next 30 years.  But these nations had essentially no
reduction in the previous 30 years.
Although there have been promising trends in contraceptive use in
recent years, much of that progress has been in urban areas.
Among 29 developing countries that participated in the World
Fertility Survey, the median total fertility rate in the major
city was 3.9, compared with 6.2 in rural areas (calculated from
data in Alam and Casterline 1984: 16).  Fifteen to 20% more
married women were practicing contraception in large cities than
in rural areas.  Both declines in fertility and increases in age
at marriage have been greater in urban than in rural areas (UN
1987a: 187).
However, data from more recent surveys show a mixed picture.  Let
us compare the urban and rural total fertility rates in l8
Demographic and Health Surveys administered between l988-89 with
national surveys taken earlier in the decade.  Urban total
fertility rates declined more than rural in seven countries, lessthan rural in five, and about the same amount in six.  Direct
comparison of surveys conducted by different agencies at
different times is, of course, subject to considerable error.
(Computed from data presented in country reports of the
Demographic and Health Surveys).
The first stages of family planning tend to select those already
highly motivated.  It is more difficult to make later inroads in
the rural populations and among the urban non-users of
contraceptives.  This depends upon the willingness of governments
to invest in family planning infrastructure and outreach programs
in less accessible areas.  "However, the social and economic
conditions inherent to under-development have frequently meant
slow progress in extending family planning services, or for that
matter, other sorts of social services, beyond the major cities"
(UN 1984: 84).
Even increases in fertility are not implausible.  These occurred
initially in many countries before fertility decline.  Healthier
and longer reproductive lives of women, and declines in breast
feeding are the reasons.  Many developing countries expect these
conditions.  Demographers from the industrialized nations also
ruefully recall that the theory of demographic transition did not
expect the post-war baby booms in the United States and several
European countries.  However, projections can accommodate both
booms and busts in birth rates.  For example, in a model by
Ahlburg and Vaupel, the U.S. total fertility rate can range from
1.8 to 3.2 births in bust/boom cycles.  This scenario is at least
as realistic as constant or declining fertility.  When we add
assumptions of one to two million immigrants per year and an
annual decline of 2% in mortality to the high projection, the
result is a U.S. population of 553 million for 2050, 31 million
more than the Census Bureau s highest current variant.  Ahlburg
and Vaupel's model projects 811 million by 2080.
Lest we think this is wildly improbable, the authors point out
that "...the average growth rate that produces it runs at only
1.3% per year...the same as the average annual growth rate that
has prevailed in the U.S. over the last century and not too much
above the 1% average annual growth rate of the last decade"
(Ahlburg and Vaupel 1990: 645).  Despite these reasonable
procedures, none of the UN's seven projections in 1992 or four
variants in 1993 includes an assumption of increasing fertility.
At the very least, the situation does not appear as promising as
that suggested by the medium projections.  Declines in world
population growth rates, in fact, stagnated in the 1980s.  This
occurred because of 1) stalls in the fertility declines of China
and India [note 8];  2) the virtual cessation of new fertility
declines since the 1970s, especially among African and South
Asian nations; and 3) a change in age structure that has favored
high birth rates (Horiuchi 1992).  While there is room for
optimism concerning the weakening impact of the last factor,
there is little ground for assuming major changes in the first
two.
Although the UN's 1992 medium projection for world population in
year 2100 contains a billion  more people than its 1982
projection, it still seems vastly optimistic.  It assumes (as
does the World Bank's projection) that Chinese fertility willdrop well below replacement early in the century.  It also
assumes that African and Latin American fertility will drop to
the replacement level by the middle of the next century.
The rationale for translating such optimistic assumptions into a
"medium" projection is not clear.  In sum, it is difficult to
disagree with a recent appraisal by the former chief of the UN
Population Division.  "There are indications that the UN
high-variant projections are more plausible than the
medium-variant projections for the poorer countries of the Third
World..." (Tabah 1992: 41).  Demographers do not limit this
argument to developing countries.  Concerning the Census Bureau s
1989 projections for the U.S., Ahlburg and Vaupel reasoned that
"their high projection might be treated as a reasonable middle
forecast" (1990: 645).
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
These observations have several implications for policymakers who
use population projections, for demographers who make the
projections, and for the institutions that support demographic
research and its dissemination.  These groups should be aware of
the frequent weakness of the data bases for projections.  The
weaknesses vary with the country, and the more developed nations
are not immune.  (For example, undetermined illegal migration and
frequent fertility swings make U.S. projections a hazardous
exercise.)  There are significant numbers of unregistered births
and deaths in many developing countries, making projections
especially difficult.  In some countries, the optimistic
assumptions about mortality (no catastrophes, famines, or AIDS)
will be problems.  But even more serious are the usually
optimistic fertility assumptions.  These depend on rapid and
substantial decline, even in countries that show no signs of such
decline.  Policymakers need to be alert to the chance that
fertility may stagnate at high levels or may even increase.  The
latter can occur as a result of such varied circumstances as
higher rates of marriage, declines in sexually transmitted
diseases, or reduced breast feeding practices.
Perhaps the most difficult task for policymakers will be to take
seriously a variety of projections, rather than one labeled as
"medium" or "most likely."  A social and economic planner
understandably prefers a single projection.  But alternate plans
should be ready, in the (not infrequent) case that projections
other than medium become reality.  Indeed, it might be prudent
for many policymakers to regard the medium estimate as a target
to achieve by specified family planning and development programs.
At the same time, we need to make plans to meet the demands for
employment, services, infrastructure, and environmental quality
resulting from increased population sizes.
Demographers can help by better packaging of their projections.
It would be better to avoid designating any of the projections as
"most likely."  Instead, they should use some more neutrallabeling (such as Projection A, B, C , and D), avoiding a
"middle" and compelling the reader to look more closely at the
various assumptions.  Alternative labels might vary according to
assumptions about family planning prevalence or advances in
women's educational levels.  Such projections might involve more
complex models than are currently in use, incorporating more
socio-economic and environmental data (and their linkages) from
each country.
We can make several recommendations regarding organizations that
support and disseminate population projections.  First, they
should continue at the present rate or increase investment to
improve basic data.  They should institutionalize surveys such as
the Demographic and Health Surveys and put them on a regular
basis for key countries.  Although fertility should remain
central to such studies, successive surveys should substitute
topics other than health.  Other topics that could profitably
link with fertility data at the household level include
environment, employment, women's status, and agriculture.  We
need to encourage more complex models incorporating these and
other data.
Agencies such as the UN and the World Bank play critical roles in
the dissemination of projections and need to exercise particular
care in packaging.  The Bank's movement away from publishing only
a single variant is a step in the right direction.  Such agencies
should also consider designating constant fertility as "high" and
the present high or medium-high variants as "medium."  Finally,
all international agency personnel who deal with developing
countries and who lack demographic expertise could profit from
training sessions dealing with the assumptions and implications
of population projections.  These are basic to the social and
economic goals of modernization and sustainability.
*The seven projection estimates based on different assumptions
about future trends in world fertility.
1)  Instant replacement assumes that fertility levels reach
replacement by 1995 and remain at that level through 2150.
2)  The low variant assumes that population growth of each
major world region will "eventually" stabilize at 1.7 children
per woman.  ("Eventually" varies for each region.  In Africa, for
example, the low variant assumes stabilization of fertility by
2040, at a level of l.7 children per woman.  The high variant
assumes fertility stabilization at 2.5 children per woman by the
year 2050).
3)  The medium/low variant assumes that fertility will
stabilize at 1.96 children per woman (or 5% below the replacement
level).
4)  The medium variant assumes that population will eventually
stabilize at the replacement level, about 2.05.
5)  The medium/high variant assumes stabilization at 2.17
children (5% above replacement level).
6)  The high fertility variant assumes that fertility will
eventually stabilize at 2.5.7)  The constant fertility variant assumes that 1990-1995
fertility levels will remain unchanged through the year 2150.
ENDNOTES
1.  The research assistance of Joseph W. Brown is gratefully
acknowledged.
2.  Since the World Bank derives its data from the UN, as well as
from the same national statistical offices as the UN, we discuss
UN procedures at greater length.  The Center for International
Research of the Bureau of the Census makes independent
projections.  These are not reviewed in this paper, other than
those dealing with the U.S. population (Figure l).
3.  The "highest" projection was increased much less than the
"middle" series, by only 17 million (3%), as compared with 92
million (31%).
4.  The UN has recently argued that since its medium projection
"has well-described future world population growth, at least for
20 to 25 year horizons...In that sense, the medium variant
projections can be thought of as 'most likely'" (UN 1993: 84).
5.  This was true as late as its 1993 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT,
but future projections are expected to include high, medium and
low variants.
6.  While more rather than fewer variants are desirable, in
practice this could exacerbate the tendency to ignore the
extremes.  A good example is a paper by El Badry (1992) in which
the new UN medium, medium-high, and medium-low variants are used
throughout, with no mention of high, low, or constant variants.
7.  The Bank uses the date at which the Net Reproduction Rate
(the mean number of surviving girl children per woman) is
expected to equal one.  The UN recently changed its procedures,
and, in the 1992 projections, assumes stabilization at
replacement levels only for its medium estimate.  In the other
extensions, fertility stabilizes at levels higher or lower than
replacement.
8.  The UN Population Division recognizes that both its l973 and
l982 forecasts  underprojected the population of Asia.  At that
time it was expected that the unprecedented declines in fertility
that took place in China and India in the late l960s would
continue at the same pace into the l990s.  However, the late
l980s saw a slowing down in the rate of fertility decline in
these two large countries  (UN Population Division l992: 5).REFERENCES
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